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GLOSSARY

Advanced Encryption Standard - “... a FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm that can
be used to protect electronic data. The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher
that can encrypt (encipher) and decrypt (decipher) information. Encryption converts
data to an unintelligible form called ciphertext; decrypting the ciphertext converts
the data back into its original form, called plaintext. The AES algorithm is capable
of using cryptographic keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in
blocks of 128 bits.” [1]
Bring-Your-Own-Device - “the new mantra of employees who are empowered to
innovate the way they work, using the technology tools they prefer.”[2]
Hierarchical Key Management Scheme - a technique that provides access controls in
multi-user systems by cryptographic keys.[3]
Mobile Device Management - “emerged recently in response to the ubiquitous adoption
of handheld mobile devices in corporations. MDM focuses on the end device rather
than the network, using client software on the devices. By communicating with the
client software, the MDM server enables IT to manage these devices.”[4]
Mode of Encryption - “In cryptography, a mode of operation is an algorithm that uses a
block cipher to provide an information service such as confidentiality or authenticity.
A block cipher by itself is only suitable for the secure cryptographic transformation
(encryption or decryption) of one fixed-length group of bits called ablock. A mode
of operation describes how to repeatedly apply a cipher's single-block operation to
securely transform amounts of data larger than a block.” [5]
Network Access Control - “technology enables IT to define and control how devices and
users gain access to network resources.”[4]
Partially Ordered Set - “In mathematics, especially order theory, a partially ordered set
(or poset) formalizes and generalizes the intuitive concept of an ordering,
sequencing, or arrangement of the elements of a set.” [6]
Security Class - Disjoint groups that users are classified into and “employee the relation
of partial ordering, that is, a security class at higher level can derive from his own
cryptographic key the keys of other security class below him”.[7]

xii
Symmetric encryption scheme - “a class of algorithms for cryptography that use the same
cryptographic keys for both encryption of plaintext and decryption of ciphertext.”[8]
Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Management Scheme - Hierarchical Key Management
Scheme in which the cryptographic key of a class are different for each time
period”.[9]

xiii

ABSTRACT

Xie, Di. M.S., Purdue University, December 2014. User-Differentiated Hierarchical Key
Management for the Bring-Your-Own-Device Environments. Major Professor: Baijian
“Justin” Yang.

To ensure confidentiality, the sensitive electronic data held within a corporation is always
carefully encrypted and stored in a manner so that it is inaccessible to those parties who
are not involved. During this process, the specific manners of how to keep, distribute, use,
and update keys which are used to encrypt the sensitive data become an important thing
to be considered. Through use of hierarchical key management, a technique that provides
access controls in multi-user systems where a portion of sensitive resources shall only be
made available to authorized users or security ordinances, required information is
distributed on a need-to-know basis. As a result of this hierarchical key management,
time-bound hierarchical key management further adds time controls to the information
access process. There is no existing hierarchical key management scheme or time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme which is able to differentiate users with the same
authority. When changes are required for any user, all other users who have the same
access authorities will be similarly affected, and this deficiency then further deteriorates
due to a recent trend which has been called Bring-Your-Own-Device. This thesis
proposes the construction of a new time-bound hierarchical key management scheme
called the User-Differentiated Two-Layer Encryption-Based Scheme (UDTLEBC), one

xiv
which is designed to differentiate between users. With this differentiation, whenever any
changes are required for one user during the processes of key management, no additional
users will be affected during these changes and these changes can be done without
interactions with the users. This new scheme is both proven to be secure as a time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme and efficient for use in a BYOD environment.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

To ensure confidentiality, the sensitive electronic data that is maintained for
corporations is always carefully encrypted and kept out of bounds to parties who are not
involved. During this process, the specific steps of how to keep, distribute, use, and
update keys, which are all used to encrypt the sensitive data, become an important thing
to be considered. This total process is one of key management.
While users in corporations are naturally, or not artificially, organized into a
hierarchy, the scheme which is used for key management by these users is called the
hierarchical key management scheme [3]. The hierarchical key management scheme can
also be viewed as a technique that provides access controls in multi-user systems 0 where
a portion of sensitive resources is only available to authorized users or where security
ordinances require that “information is distributed on a need-to-know basis” [11]. To
fulfill such need-to-know requirements, users are categorized into different disjoint
groups. Each specific disjoint group represents a special type of users based on their
access authorities. These disjoint groups are called security classes [7]. The data in
maintained for the government is always categorized into four classes: “unclassified”,
“confidential”, “secret”, and “top-secret”. Following categorization, only limited people
are assigned the authority to access data which is categorized as either “secret” or “top-
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secret” [9]. In another words, the senior officers have greater access authorities than do
those new staff members, who typically can only access the “unclassified” data.
The deficiency of the hierarchical key management scheme is that researchers fail to
consider those cases where users are provided with access for only a short time period.
Such constraints are common in real world practices. A company might frequently
provide a number of short-time jobs or internships to college students. When absorbing
these college students into the corporate structure, the company should ensure that these
college students do and can only have access to sensitive data during their specific time
of contract.
This demand for time constraints has given birth to the time-bound hierarchical key
management scheme. With the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme, access
is restricted both by the security class of the data and the purported “valid” time assigned
to said data. The concept of the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme was
first proposed by Tzeng in 2002 [9] and further developed thereafter [12][13][14][15][16].

1.2

Problem Statement

No existing hierarchical key management scheme or time-bound hierarchical key
management scheme can be employed to effectively differentiate between users who are
at the same level of authority. If varied users all have an identical access authorization,
they are then treated equally by their ability to share matching secret keys and private
data. A more detailed introduction of this topic shall be introduced in sections 2.1 and 2.2.
This level of similar or equal treatment will often cause problems when an organization is
handling personnel changes. A senior manager might leave a company in pursuit of other
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business interests. The resignation may be quite unexpected, and the former employee
typically maintains privileges to access the sensitive data because of the fact that the
secret key and private data information which has been assigned to her/him have not yet
expired. In response to the resignation, the information technology (IT) department of the
company, which is the central authority of access control, is required to immediately
withdraw the senior manager’s accessibility in order to avoid a potential data leakage by
changing the keys. Since there is no differentiation among users, everyone who has been
assigned the same access authority as the person leaving the organization will be
similarly rejected to access at this time. The IT department is required to update and
reassign new secret keys and data to restore these users’ access authorities.
With an efficient time-bound hierarchical key management scheme, this process of
regeneration and reassignment does not lead to great inconvenience because personal
changes are not part of the daily routine. This problem has been found to be seriously
deteriorating as a result of a recently growing trend called Bring-Your-Own-Device
(BYOD).
Corporate organizations adopt BYOD to encourage and allow their employees who
are using personal devices to have access to privileged company data, information,
applications, and systems [2]. Currently, the security of BYOD is ensured by two major
techniques, named the (1) Network Access Control (NAC) and (2) Mobile Device
Management (MDM) [4]. NAC is a technique used to secure the corporate network
through user and device identification [4]. Mobile Device Management (MDM) is an
emerging technique that aims at securing the mobile device by means of a secure
container system and enforced security policies [4]. A secure container is an isolated,
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partitioned, and secure environment applied to a device which may be used to run
corporate applications and to store related sensitive corporate data. Through the usage of
such containers the company works to build a more enhanced and secure corporate
infrastructure for specific devices and better isolate the corporate construct from
interference from personal usage [17].
A sketch is shown in Figure 1.1. The security of BYOD can be divided into three
layers [4]. The first layer is the security of mobile device network access control. This
layer is used to provide for safe networking based on the access policies, which will
categorize the users into specific groups, such as guest, limited, and full. Limited users
will have greater access authorities than do guest users, and full users shall have access to
the entire body of the system. The second layer is that of the security held by mobile
device management, the construct which provides the integrated mobile device
configuration and operation policies. The third layer is that of the security held by the
mobile device app stores. These app stores shall aim to provide safe and certified apps in
order to ensure that users avoid downloading malware or trojans. These three layers work
together to provide strong protection for the personal devices.
With recent developments in both hardware and software, these two elements are
becoming increasingly capable of protecting devices from potential attacks. The
measured success has been proven by passing the tests of the U.S. federal government.
The federal government has opened the department’s door to the next generation of
BlackBerry and Android devices on May 2 [18] and Apple’s iOS 6 devices on May 17,
2014 [19].
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Figure 1.1 BYOD Security Structure
The core concept of BYOD produces a fact that companies no longer have the
proprietorship of a number of devices connected into their intranet. This change results in
significant influences to the application of the hierarchical key management scheme.
One consequence is that key updates and reassignments will be more frequent.
Personal devices are carried everywhere by their owners, so these devices have an
increased chance to be lost or stolen than do those devices which are managed by
companies under strong security policies. A recent study has discovered that “more than
7,000 devices were lost in seven airports over a twelve month period” and a growing
number of thefts occurred between 2007 to 2011 [20]. When a particular device is lost,
the older key which was stored on that device should then be abandoned and a relevant
new key must be updated and reassigned. We find that problems arise which are similar
to those when an employee should choose to leave the company; it is not only one key
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that must be reassigned, but the keys for all users who have access to the same body of
information. This is an unfortunate result of the current BYOD security systems.
Another consequence is that the actual processes of key updates and reassignments
have become formidable in BYOD environment. Since companies no longer have the
proprietorship of some devices, companies cannot approach updates and reassignments
without seeking the direct permission of their employees. These companies have to
define an acceptance baseline of what security and supportability features a BYOD
device should support with their employees. The access control is now an awkward
combination of the authority an employee has to access corporate data and the authority
that company has to manipulate said employee’s device.

New contracts between

companies and employees have to be carefully designed in order to avoid any potential
infringement related to privacy and personal property [21]. Extra costs may arise in the
design, management, and disposal of these contracts.
Faced with the frequency and formidability of these consequences, this author
desires that a new time-bound hierarchical key management scheme with a capability of
user differentiation could be built, one which permits that when some changes for a user
are required, no additional users shall be affected. It is the research goal that all of these
changes can be implemented without any direct interactions with users or their devices,
thereby permitting less efforts and costs to avoid any potential privacy infringements.
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1.3

Research Question

The basic research question of this thesis is: Is it possible to build a truly provable
secure and efficient time-bound hierarchical key management scheme that is capable of
differentiating users in the BYOD environment?

1.4

Significance

This thesis proposes a new time-bound hierarchical key management scheme known
as the User-Differentiated Two-Layer Encryption-Based Construction (UDTLEBC) by
modifying an existing time-bound hierarchical key management scheme, the Two-Layer
Encryption-Based Construction (TLEBC). UDTLEBC is constructed with three
objectives.
First, the new time-bound hierarchical key management scheme has the capability of
user differentiation. When rejecting or accepting one user’s access to a security class in a
specific time period, other users in the same security class during the same time period
will not be affected. On this basis, all changes can be implemented without interactions
with users, so the problems of privacy and cost can be precluded.
Second, the new time-bound hierarchical key management scheme is assumed
provably secure, i.e., the adoption of this scheme shall not sway its original capacity for
security.
At last, he new time-bound hierarchical key management scheme is efficient. That is
to say, the performance of the scheme will be evaluated in order to show that the new
capability does not generate any significant decline in performance.
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1.5

Delimitations

This research focuses only on building a new hierarchical key management scheme
with a capability of user differentiation and an ability to establish its security and
performance. The new scheme is considered relevant to key distribution and associated
access control, so this scheme shall only be used to ensure the confidentiality of data. The
BYOD environment will not be discussed in further detail in this thesis, because the
process of creating authentic real practices within a BYOD environment actually involve
even more complex problems, in which the privacy, efficiency, and cost concerns are
merely a few elements of the whole [21]. BYOD will be treated as a truly broad
background, and be dealt with in terms of only a few basic concepts in the realm of this
study. The security and performance of this scheme will be evaluated from a hierarchical
key management scheme perspective rather than by discussing the safety and
performance within a real BYOD case in which the environment is complex and where
the scheme used may be uncertain. For convenience, the symmetric encryption scheme
AES is to be used in all of the cases where a symmetric scheme is required, so that the
performance shall necessarily be affected if a different scheme should be used.

1.6

Limitations

This thesis works on building a time-bound hierarchical key management scheme
for access controls within a BYOD environment. Only confidentiality and accessibility
are considered in this thesis. Security concerns, such as integrity and availability, shall
not be considered. The performance of the device is tested by using one emulator and one
device, so that the actual performance obtained may be limited by the capability of the
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emulator and the device. Detailed information of the emulator and the device shall be
provided in this paper to permit others to predict the possibilities of achieving different
(better or worse) results through the use of different equipment.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter first provides detailed definitions for both the hierarchical key
management scheme and the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme. Then, a
historical retrospect is approached to review the evolution of a hierarchical key
management scheme and the emergence of the time-bound hierarchical key management
scheme. Based on the evolutionary history, this thesis then illustrates that no existing
schemes provides the capability of user differentiation, which is believed to be required
within a BYOD environment. Further analyzing the capabilities and performance
required in a BYOD environment, this thesis explains why TLEBC is believed to be more
compatible to the BYOD environment. At last, the TLEBC is briefly introduced.

2.1

Hierarchical Key Management Scheme

This section briefly explains the concept of a hierarchical key management scheme,
which is summarized by the author (Relevant works were introduced in section 2.3). In a
multi-user system, assume that a set of users are divided into a set of disjoint classes
which are called security classes. If we assume that users in one security class have
greater access authority than do users in another security class, then a binary relation
symbol

is used to denote the relationship between these two classes. An example is

shown below to introduce such binary relations.
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Figure 2.1 A Binary Relation between Two Security Classes
As shown in Figure 2.1, C1 and C 2 are two security classes and C1 has more access
authority than does C 2 . A relationship, C2

C1 , represents a binary relationship of how

users in class C1 can access data in class C 2 , but not vice versa. Obviously, these users
can access data within their own security class, so the relationships C1  C1 and C2  C2
are valid and such a binary relationship is valid for any security class Ci .
If we put security classes in one set, then a hierarchy can be built according to the
concept of a partially ordered set (poset). Within the order theory, a partially ordered set
formalizes elements of a set by binary relationships which present the ordering of
elements. A binary relation indicates that one element can denote another element; for
example, security class C1 can indicate security class C 2 within the previous example.
The term “partially” is used to denote that not every pair of elements within the set has a
binary relationship.
Such a poset hierarchy can be shown by a graph G * , in which security classes and
binary relations are shown. Each path in the graph G * presents a binary relation between
a pair of security classes and a reflexive of a security class. The graph G * can be reduced
to a graph G, where G denotes the minimal presentation of the graph G * . If we use V to
denote a set of security classes and E * or E to denote a set of binary relations, Figure
2.2 provides a direct view of G * and G by using an example of four disjoint security
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classes C1, C2, C3, C4 with the following binary relationships: C1 C1 , C2  C1 , C2  C2 ,

C3  C1 , C3  C3 , C4  C1 , C4  C2 , and C4  C4 .

Figure 2.2 Partially Ordered Hierarchy Graphs G* and G
Under the poset hierarchy, users in one security class are not allowed to access data
that belongs to another security class unless they already have the direct authority, i.e., a
user in security class Ci can access data in security class C j if and only if there is a
binary relationship defined as C j  Ci . To satisfy this requirement, data in different
security classes are encrypted by different secret keys in order to protect them. The secret
key of each security class is only assigned to those users belonging to that security class
and to users who are in other security classes but also have access to the data. By using
the same example presented in Figure 2.2, if ki is used to denote the secret key of
security class Ci , then users are assigned secret keys by the following table:
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Table 2.1 Key Assignments for Users in Different Security Classes
Users

Key Assignments

Users in security class C1

k1 , k2 , k3 , k4

Users in security class C 2

k2 , k4

Users in security class C3

k3

Users in security class C 4

k4

The “higher” a security class within the hierarchy, the more keys which the users in
that security class are required to maintain. If users in the security class are “high” in the
hierarchy, they have will then have to maintain more keys for accessing data protected
the varied security classes which are “low” in the hierarchy. Since the number of keys
will expand as the number of security classes and binary relationships increases, storage
problems may emerge with hierarchical escalation because those users within the “high”
levels of security will need to maintain a large number of keys.
Accordingly, a hierarchical key management scheme is a cryptographic technique
designed to build relationships between keys. Such a process is called a key derivation.
The term “key derivation” means that a secret key can be used to compute other secret
keys. More precisely, a secret key of a particular security class can be used to compute
another secret key of another security class if, and only if, there is a binary relationship
within the poset hierarchy. This process of key derivation cannot be reversed. The
advantage of this technique is that users only have to store one secret key regardless
whether they are in a security class that is deemed “high” or “low” in the hierarchy and
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regardless of the size of the hierarchy. When they need to access data in other security
classes, they can use the secret key assigned to their own security class with the purpose
to compute to secret keys which they require. By using the example as is found in Figure
2.2, the following table illustrates these result after using a hierarchical key management
scheme:
Table 2.2 Key Assignments and Derivations after Using
Hierarchical Key Management Scheme
Users

Key Assignments

Users in security Class C1

k1

Key Derivations

k1

k2

k1

k3

k1

k4

k2

k

Users in security Class C 2

k2

C3

k3

None

Users in security Class C 4

k4

None

Users in security Class

4

From Table 2.2, it could be seen that users merely have to store one secret key
which belongs to the whole of their security classes, so that the total of the required
storage is strongly reduced by using the hierarchical key management scheme.
To enable such a key derivation, secret keys usually have to be generated by a
specific generation algorithm, so that the secret keys can be generated with some existent
and predetermined binary relationships amongst them. Different hierarchical key
management schemes have different generation algorithms which are designed to realize
the key derivation intended. The generation algorithm also generates both the private and
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public data, which are then used to help with the key derivation. Private data may be sent
secretly to the individual users because of the fact that the leakage of such private data
might contribute to varied attacks. On the other hand, public data is typically made
available to the public because an adversary cannot obtain any particular advantages
through gaining this knowledge. With this information in hand, Table 2.2 can then be
extended as follows:
Table 2.3 Key Generation, Assignments, and Key Derivation through the Use of a
Hierarchical Key Management Scheme
Users

Key Generation

Key Assignments

Users in security
k1 , priv1

Class C1

Key derivation

k1 , priv1 , pub

k2

k1 , priv1 , pub

k3

k1 , priv1 , pub

k4

k 2 , priv2 , pub

k

Users in security
Class C 2
Users in security

k 2 , priv2

k1 , k 2 , k3 , k 4

4

priv1 , priv2
pub

C
Class 3

k3

None

k4

None

Users in security
Class C 4

In such a case, then

  t ,t , t  . The private data s 
4

5

6

2,

is assigned to the user in

order to ensure that the user can only generate the decryption key k j ,t , whereby j
denotes a security class C j such that C j

C

2

and t denotes the time periods t4 , t5 , and t6 .

Thus, as compared to a hierarchical key management scheme, the time-bound
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hierarchical key management scheme further divides users in each security class into
more groups corresponding to different combinations of short time periods.

2.2

Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Management Scheme

This section briefly explains the concept of a time-bound hierarchical key
management scheme, which is summarized by the author (Relevant works were
introduced in section 2.3). A time-bound hierarchical key management scheme is a
special application of the hierarchical key management scheme. Within a hierarchical key
management scheme, time is not considered a factor and once a user is categorized into a
security class, the user would belong to that security class forever. To delete a user from a
security class, the central authority needs to change the secret key of the security class
and to reassign a new secret key to all of the users affected. But within a time-bound
hierarchal key management schemes, a user will merely belong to a security class for a
specified time period. When that time period expires, the user will be eliminated from the
security class and shall lose the access authority which he/she once had. This process can
be done automatically without regeneration, reassignment or any other participation from
the central authority.
To effectuate such a capability, a central authority will first decide the length of the
time period, i.e. the long time period. This time period usually extends over a period of
key updates. In some real world cases, such a time period could be a season, half a year,
or even a year. This long time period will be further divided into a sequence of short time
periods. The length of the short time period is also decided by the central authority. An
illustrative diagram is shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3 Time Sequences
The capital T is used to denote the long time period, and ti , i 1,2,3,..., n are used to
denote the short time periods within the long time period T. Assume that the long time
period is the month of January and short time period is merely one day. There are 31 days
in January, so there will be 31 short time periods within the long time period. t1 denotes
the first day of the January, t 2 denotes the second day of January, ..., and t31 denotes the
last day of the January.
On this basis, each security class no longer uses only one key to encrypt data but a
set of keys corresponding to the short time periods. If each key is denoted by ki ,t where i
denotes the security class the key assigned to and t denotes the short time period, key

k1,1 is used by security class C1 to protect its data in short time period t1 , key k1, 2 is used
by security class C1 to protect its data in time-period t 2 , and so on. A time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme would generate a set of keys for each security class
for each short time period. Each security class will be assigned n keys, where n is the
number of short time periods within a long time period. Each user will be assigned a
specific piece of private data according to that security class in which the user exists and
the short time period the user is allowed to access the data. We denote such specific
private data by sv , , where v stands for the security class the user is in and  stands for
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the combination of short time periods in which the user is allowed to access the data. By
using the same poset hierarchy shown in Figure 2.2 and same time period shown in
Figure 2.3, assume that a user in security class C 2 is allowed to access the data on days 4,
5, and 6; then process of key assignment and derivation are shown in the following table:
Table 2.4 Key Assignment and Derivation of Time-bound Hierarchical
Key Management Scheme for a Specific User
User Definition

Key Assignment

A user belongs to security

k 2 , s2 ,

, where



stands for

class C 2 and has access

the combination of

authority on day 4 and 5

t4 , t5 , and t6

In such a case, then

Key Derivation
k 2 , s2, , pub


k 2, 4 , k 2,5 , k 2, 6 ,

k 4, 4 , k 4,5 , k 4, 6

t ,t 5 , t6  . The private data s2, is assigned to the user in

 4

order to ensure that the user can only generate the decryption key k j ,t , whereby j
denotes a security class C j such that C j

C2 and t denotes the time periods t4 , t5 , and t6 .

Thus, as compared to a hierarchical key management scheme, the time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme further divides users in each security class into
more groups corresponding to different combinations of short time periods.

2.3

Evolutionary History of Hierarchical Key Management Schemes and Time-Bound
Hierarchical Key Management Schemes
This section briefly reviews the contributions of other researchers. The first poset

hierarchical key management scheme was proposed in 1983 by Aki and Taylor [3]. In
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their scheme, users are assigned both a prime and a secret key. Some public data is then
made available to the users in order to allow them to implement the key derivation. The
security of the scheme is based on a discrete logarithm problem, which is generally
believed to be difficult. As the first hierarchical key management scheme, it has been
found to have several deficiencies. One major problem is that this scheme requires a
significant amount of storage space. In 1985, Mackinnon et al. [22] proposed an
improved algorithm that could be used with the Aki-Taylor scheme [3]. This algorithm
reduces the amount of public data required by the original scheme, and the required
amount of public data was further reduced in 1990 by Harn and Lin [23]. In the original
Akl-Taylor scheme [3], the keys are generated in a single linear fashion, proceeding from
top to bottom. Harn and Lin [23] then changed this key generation process, so that it was
reversed from top-down to bottom-up, a method which requires less storage of the public
data.
Besides working to reduce the required amount of storage, many researchers have
also tried to make these schemes more “flexible”. This schematic flexibility can be
comprehended in two ways. First, the scheme is seen to be suitable for all kinds of
situations. Chick and Tavares [24] proposed a special usage of the scheme to enable
access control of a set of services, where these services are not necessarily organized
within a poset hierarchy. Ohta et al. [25] proposed a scheme especially designed for
membership authentication. In their scheme, users are allowed to prove their membership
without revealing any additional information (for example, the user’s actual name). Lin et
al. [26] proposed a scheme that could be utilized not only in a poset hierarchy but also
within more complicated circumstances. A second type of improved flexibility involves
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the fact that the scheme, itself, is more flexible to change. Researchers have repeatedly
tried to make these changes convenient and fast by reducing the impact of said changes.
In 1993, Chang and Buehrer [10] improved the scheme proposed by Mackinnon et al. [22]
by importing a one-way trap door function into the scheme. It was discovered that the
step of adding a new security class into the poset hierarchy would not necessarily affect
most of the previously existing security classes. Hwang and Yang proposed another
scheme [27] in 2003, a scheme which provided two contributions. First, it was found that
fewer keys are required in their proposed scheme as compared to those existent in
previous schemes. Second, they discovered that the process of adding or deleting a
security class would affect only a minimal amount of security classes found within the
hierarchy.
Other researchers are also providing new schemes which are not based on the
research branches that were derived from the Akl-Taylor scheme [3]. Sandu [28] had
proposed a hierarchical key management scheme in 1988, using a totally different
algorithm. This scheme generates keys through use of a one-way function and the
assignment of IDs to each security class. The schematic security depends on the fact that
the process of a one-way function cannot be reversed. A large problem with this system
remains in the fact that the key derivation of the scheme cannot be approached directly.
By using the scheme, a secret key assigned to a security class can only be used to derive
secret keys of security classes which are immediate predecessors. To compute a secret
key of a security class which is lower in the hierarchy, the intermediate secret keys in the
chain must also be generated, thereby leading to many unnecessary computations.

21
The same problem is also evident in Chang et al.’s scheme [29], proposed in 1992,
and Liaw et al.’s scheme [7], proposed in 1993. Both of these research parties relied upon
Newton’s interpolation method and one-way functions to construct their schemes. Key
derivations of their schemes are also indirect. This deficiency was overcome by Hwang
[30] in 1999. Hwang subtly used the property of a discrete logarithm and proposed a
scheme with similar steps while computing the secret keys directly. Ray et al. [11]
provided another solution to this problem which was also found to solve this deficiency.
Zhong [31] proposed a scheme in 2002 through use of the Hash functions. This
scheme typically requires less storage than do most of previous schemes. Shen and Chen
[32] also proposed a new scheme in 2002 by combining the advantages of Akl-Taylor
scheme [3] and Sandu’s scheme [28], through their use of the Hash functions. This
scheme was then improved by Das et al. [33] in 2005, through a reduction in both its
computational overhead and security weaknesses. Tzeng et al. [34] continued with
improvements in 2010 in order to reduce the computational time required for key
generation and derivation. Sun and Liu [35] proposed another new scheme in 2004 and
worked to prove that their scheme required less communication, computation, and
storage.
Additional schemes have also been developed which focus more specifically on
satisfying particular objectives. Tsai and Chang [36] had proposed a scheme which was
based on such factors as: polynomial interpolation, the Chinese remainder, and the Rabin
public key system. This scheme was specially designed to provide its users with the
capability to freely change their secret keys and their positions within the hierarchy. The
scheme was further improved by Kuo et al. [37] by work which enabled an increased
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flexibility to change both security classes and keys. The scheme of Kuo [37] was further
improved by Hwang [38] in 1999 and Chen and Chung [39] in 2002. First, Hwang was
able to reduce the computations required for key generation and derivation. Then, Chen
and Chung improved the scheme with regards to both the computation time and storage
size.
Birget et al. [40] and Zhang and Wang [41] both proposed schemes that were not
only related to the hierarchy of a set of users but also to the hierarchy of a set of data.
These researchers worked to develop and/or generate an integral poset hierarchy in which
the node in the hierarchy could be either a security class or a special category of data. Lin
[42] proposed a scheme that can be efficiently implemented with low cost chips. Chien
and Jan [43] presented a scheme similar to that of Lin’s [42] but then further reduced the
computational load and implementation costs. Ferrara and Masucci [44] designed their
scheme from an information-theoretic approach in order to ensure that their scheme was
unconditionally secure.
Tzeng [9] proposed the first time-bound hierarchical key management scheme in
2002. He used modular exponentiation, the Lucas function, and the one-way Hash
function to enable the capability of time restrictions. The scheme was not only too
complicated, but also vulnerable to collusion attacks [45]. Another time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme [15] was proposed later by Chen, but quickly
proved to be insecure against collusion attacks [46]. Bertino et al. [13] proposed another
time-bound hierarchical key management scheme in 2008 through use of a tamperresistant device, but this was again found to be vulnerable to collusion attack by Sun et al.
[46] in 2009. Wang and Laih [16] then worked to propose an efficient time-bounded
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hierarchical key management scheme in 2006 beginning with the concepts in the AkiTaylor scheme [3]. Since they did not adequately formalize the definition of “security” in
their research, a question remained as to whether their scheme was provably secure. In
2012, a provably-secure time-bounded hierarchical key management scheme was
proposed by Ateniese et al. [12]. Ateniese et al. provided detailed steps for the security
proof of their scheme. In the same year, Chen et al. [14] proposed another scheme which
some believe to be efficient for defeating collision attacks without the necessity of a
tamper-resistant device. With the information that has been gathered and the lessons
learned regarding other time-bound hierarchical schemes, the security of Chen et al.’s
scheme [14] has been comprehended as having not been breached as of yet.

2.4

Capabilities and Performances of Hierarchical Key Management Schemes and
Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Management Schemes

From the evolutional history of both the hierarchical key management scheme and
the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme, it is easy to observe that previous
researchers had tried to improve the hierarchical key management scheme or time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme by offering new schemes with either additional
capabilities or a better performance rating. Among these previous efforts, the capabilities
and levels of performance which these previous researchers sought to pursue may be
summarized (by this Author) as follows:
1. Capabilities:
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a) Capability of key derivation: the secret key assigned to a security class which
can be used to compute secret keys of another security class if a binary
relationship exists.
b) Capability of direct key derivation: if the secret key assigned to a particular
security class is used to compute a secret key assigned to another security class,
such key derivation can be done directly without generating any other secret
keys.
c) Capability of access control (security): by using the scheme, users should be
rejected from accessing data in those security classes in which they are

not

allowed access according to either hierarchy or that point in time. Since the data
is protected by the secret keys, it requires that the process of key derivation
cannot be reversed.
d) Applicability of the scheme: which establishes whether the scheme can be used
under a more complicated policy protocol rather than a poset hierarchy.
2. Performance:
a) Complexity of key updates: involves the repercussion of key updates, including
the number of steps, time, and how many security classes would be affected by
the key updates.
b) Complexity of hierarchical change: involves the repercussion of adding or
deleting a class or adding or deleting a binary relation between two security
classes, including the number of steps, time, and how many security
classes would be affected by the hierarchical change.
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c) Computation overhead: involves the computation amount or time needed for key
derivation.
d) Private storage requirement: involves the amount of storage required on the end
devices.
e) Public storage requirement: involves the amount of storage required on the
public servers.

The term “capabilities” works to describe those elements for which a hierarchical
key management scheme is required to be capable. There are no particular orders of
importance among the varying capabilities. Capabilities are known as the clear
requirements that a scheme should satisfy. Different schemes will have various
performance abilities when these schemes are compared with each other. According to
the varying situations, some performance requirements will then become viewed as more
important than others. If a scheme is implemented into an electronic library system, the
importance of the complexity of hierarchical change would be minimal because it is rare
to add or delete a new security class or a binary relation between two security classes in
such system.
No existing scheme provides for the capability of user differentiation. The
development of a new scheme is needed in order to overcome the challenges existent
within a BYOD environment. The next section shall provide an analysis to determine
which performance of the scheme shall be found to be most important in a BYOD
environment and to verify why TLEBC is currently believed to be the most compatible
scheme in a BYOD environment.

26
2.5

Requirements of Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Management Schemes in a BringYour-Own-Device Environment
Two major changes can be observed in a BYOD environment. First, the devices are

no longer owned by the corporate companies. In the sense of a time-bound hierarchical
key management scheme, this change indicates that the central authority no longer has
full control over the end devices. Central authority has to cooperate with users in order to
proceed with necessary changes, such as key updates or hierarchical changes, so a decline
in the level of efficiency may be expected because permission from users must be sought
and gained. The complexity of key updates and hierarchical changes frequently become
more important when compared to the original working mode process.
Second, these devices are brought by individual users in a BYOD environment but
not through unified purchase process (when all devices were under corporate ownership),
which indicates that the quality of these devices cannot be guaranteed. To implement a
time-bound hierarchical key management scheme, the central authority has to ensure that
the scheme can operate efficiently even with the poorest devices. This requirement
indicates that the computation overhead and private storage requirements become more
important as compared to when the corporation owned all devices. A poorly designed
device might not be able both to efficiently support a large computation overhead and
meet private storage requirements.
The TLEBC is a time-bound hierarchical key management scheme proposed by
Ateniese et al. [12]. It is believed to be the most compatible to the requirements of a
time-bound hierarchical key management scheme within an BYOD environment by the
author of this thesis because it performs superbly when one considers the complexity of
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key updates, complexity of hierarchical changes, computation overhead, and private
storage requirements. Through use of the TLEBC, whenever there is a need to change a
key or do any modification to the hierarchy, in most cases these processes can be
accomplished by changing the public data stored on the corporate server, which is owned
by the central authority. It is only when a new security class has been added into the
system, that the secret keys or private data must be updated. There is no need to change
any secret keys or private data on the end devices. These changes of keys and hierarchy
no longer require the corporation to gain permission from individual users. The scheme
requires only one piece of private data to be stored on the end device. Thus, the private
storage requirement is very small. The key derivation can be done in a single step of
decryption through use of a symmetric cryptographic algorithm, so the computational
overhead will also remain insignificant if an efficient symmetric cryptographic algorithm
is used.
Basing on the excellent performances of the TLEBC with regards to the complexity
of key updates, complexity of hierarchical changes, computation overhead, and private
storage requirements, this scheme is believed to be the one which is the most compatible
to the BYOD environment, for it merely lacks the capability of user differentiation.

2.6

Two-Level Encryption-Based Construction

This section briefly introduces the concept of the time-bound hierarchical key
management scheme TLEBC. Here we shall recall the concept of the time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme [12]. As was shown in section 2.2, assume that for
each security class Cu and each short time period t j , a secret key ku ,t j is generated as an
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encryption key in order to protect the data in said security class over a short time period.
Each user would belong to a security class and have the access to data only in several
short time periods. If

i

is used to indicate a possible combination of such a short time

period, then a set  is established, such that i  
combinations

i

is used to indicate such

[12]. If the security class Cv is used to indicate that designated security

class within which the user works, then a user can be identified by both the security class
Cv and the combination

i

. A private value sv ,i could be used to indicate the access

authority by which that user is categorized in security class Cv within a set of short time
periods

i

[12].

TLEBC is built on a graph which presents the binary relationship between sv ,i and

ku ,t j [12]. sv , is listed in the superstratum and ku ,t j is listed in the substratum. For any
i

short time period t j and combination of short time periods

i

, if t j  i holds, then a path

from sv ,i to ku ,t j will be constructed. Assume that there are three security classes R, M,
and N, and R is authorized to access data within both M and N. Also assume that only
two short time periods, t1 and t 2 , are considered; then there exists three possible
combinations:

i

such that

1

t1 , 2  t 2 , and 3  t1 ,t 2  . Figure 2.4 shows the

resulting graph of the construction of the example.
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Figure 2.4 Example of a Transformation Graph for TLEBC
The TLEBC will assign one piece of sv ,

i

to each user to indicate their access

authorities and publish public data p( sv , ) ku ,t  that could be used to compute encryption
i
j
keys. If a user has access in all the security classes R, M, and N, and in both of the time
periods t1 and t 2 , then the secret value S R ,3 will be assigned to the user to indicate that
the user can have access to all of the security classes, since M
of the time periods, since

3

t1 ,t 2  .



R and N



R , and to all

To generate a specific key, for example K M ,t1 , in

order to access data belonged to security class M within the short time period t1 , then the
user will have the capacity to obtain public data p sR ,

3

p sR ,3

k M ,t1 

to generate the specific key K M ,t1 .

k M ,t1 

and use both sv ,

i

and
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CHAPTER 3. NEW SCHEME - UDTLEBC

This chapter presents how the new scheme – that of the User-Differentiable TwoLayer Encryption-Based Construction (UDTLEBC) – is built based on the basic concept
of the TLEBC. The UDTELBC follows the definition of time-bound hierarchical key
management Gen, Der  and requires a symmetric encryption scheme

  , , D 

as a

necessary building part (See Appendix A, and Definitions 1 and 2 for detailed definitions
of the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme and symmetric encryption
scheme). UDTLEBC had the capability of user differentiation. This capability is also
illustrated in this chapter.

3.1

User-Differentiated Two-Layer Encryption-Based Construction

Consider a minimal presentation graph G

V , E 

of a poset hierarchy where V

indicates the nodes in the poset hierarchy and E indicates the links from nodes to a set of
various time combinations

, so that

i

where

i

is a possible combination of short

time periods ti (introduced in section 2.6). A transformation graph G

 V , E 

,

which presents the binary relationships existent between sv ,i and ku ,t j , can be built by
transferring the minimal presentation graph G
introduced in Ateniese et al.’s work [12]:

V , E 

with the following criteria
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1. For each class v V and each combination of short time periods

  , a class v

is

put in a set called V .
2. For each class u V and each short time period t  T , a class u t is put in a set called
V .

3. Let V

V

V .

4. For each class v V , each combination of short time periods

  , and each short

time period t  T , if t  , an edge between v and vt is put in E .
5. For each pair of classes v V and u V , each time sequence

  , and each short

time period t  T , if there is a path between v and u in graph G and t  , an edge
between v and u t is put in E .
6. Construct G

 V , E 

This transformation graph G

 V , E 

presents the mappings from sv , to ku ,t j .
i

Since each of these users can be categorized into a specific class v  U  by assigning a
private data sv , , thus, the mappings can be found between users and the private data

sv , may be assigned to them too. Let ID denote each user and a set V denote the users
so that ID  V , and let F denote the mappings so that f ID  sv , . From the view of
the transformation graph, another part of graph G#$
basis of G

% !V#$ , F#$ "

could be added on the

 V , E  and be used to enable the capability of user differentiation.

Assume that the hierarchy and time periods used in the example are those from
section 2.6 and the five users and five mappings, employed to offer the visual assistance
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provided with in Figure 3.1, are

f ID4   sR ,1 , and
G



V , F and G

f ID1   sM ,1 ,

f ID2   sR ,1 ,

f ID3

sR ,

3

,

f ID5   s N ,3 . Figure 3.1 then shows the combination of
 V , E 

in UDTLEBC.

Figure 3.1 Example of a Transformation Graph for UDTLEBC
G



V , F

presents the mappings from ID to sv ,i . Thus, by assigning ID to

users, a user can first generate the secret value sv ,i , which indicates its access authority,
and then computes the key ku ,t j by using the secret value sv ,i generated. One the basis of
the construction of TLEBC [12], we modified the original algorithms and generated new
algorithms for UDTLEBC as following:

By the transformation graphs G



V , F

and G

 V , E 

, the graph of a

poset hierarchy G  V , E  , time periods that are t  T , combinations of time periods that
are

i  

, and a symmetric encryption scheme that is

algorithms of UDTLEBC is built as follows:

# " ! ,

, D  , the Gen and Der
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Algorithm. Gen 1 , G , P 
1. For each user, let ID   1 
2. For each class v in V , let sv,



1 ;


3. For each class u t in V , randomly choose a secret value ku ,t  0,1 ;
4. Let I and k be the sequences of private information ID and ku ,t ;
5. For any pair of classes ID, v   V  V such that ID, v!  F , padding or splitting

sv ," to the length of

#

and compute the public information p( ID ) $sv ,) % * E ID &S v ,( ' ;

6. For any pair of classes +v1 , ut , 0 V. / V- such that 2v7 , ut 3 6 E45 , compute the public
information p( sv ,< ) 8ku ,t 9 = Esv ,< :k v ,t ; ;
7. Let pub be the sequence of public information computed in the previous step; and
8. Output >ID, k , pub ? .

Algorithm Der @1C , G, P, u , v, B , IDi , t , pub A
1. Extract the public value p( ID ) Dsv ,F E from pub;
2. Calculate the value sv,N

O

DID K pG IDHIsv ,M J L;

3. Extract the public value p( sv ,R )Pku ,t Q from pub; and
4. Output the key kv,t

X

Dsu ,W UpSsv ,W TSku ,t T V.
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3.2

Capabilities of User Differentiation Through Use of UDTLEBC

Since each user is assigned a specific ID , each user can be differentiated from
others because these users are no long sharing the identical private keys or values. From
Figure 3.1 Example of a Transformation Graph for UDTLEBC we can now see that in
order to remove any access authority or change any encryption key used, only the middle
and bottom layer is required to be changed. Thus, all changes can be accomplished
without modification of those IDs which have already been assigned and are in use,
thereby permitting modifications to be done at the central authority side without
unnecessary interference with the users. Now, we shall discuss each type of change in
greater detail, in part by providing specific examples. The identical hierarchy and time
periods that were employed in section 2.6 shall still be the standard for the following
cases. The specific examples are as follows:

3.2.1

Add a new security class

Adding a new security class can be simply done by adding new secret values, keys,
and mappings to the transformation graph. Assume that a new security class O is added
into the hierarchy under security class M . Then, then the following modifications are
needed:
1  for

1. For security class O , generate sO ,i



2. For security class O , select kO ,t1

0,1 and kO ,t2  0,1 ; and

1 , 2 ,

and

3 ;



3. Compute and publish p( sR , ) kO ,t   EsR , kO ,ti  , p( sM , )kO ,t   EsM , kO ,ti  ,
i

i

p( sO , ) kO ,t   EsO , kO ,ti  , and for all
i

i

i

i

i

and all kO ,ti .

i

i

i
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3.2.2

Delete an existing security class

Deleting an existing security class can be simply done by deleting all secret values,
keys, and public data associated with the security class. Assume that the security class

M is deleted from the hierarchy. Then, the following modifications are needed.
1. Remove sM , i for

1 , 2 ,

and

3 ;

2. Remove k M ,t1 and k M ,t2 ; and
3. Remove p( sM ,i ) ku ,ti  for all sM ,i and all k M ,ti .

3.2.3

Update one key

Updating one key can be simply done by updating the key and relevant public data.
If one assumes that k M ,t1 needs to be updated, then the following modifications are
needed:
1. Update K M .t1 : and
2. Update public data p( sv , i ) kM ,t1 for all existing mappings from sv , i .

3.2.4 Add a new user into the system
Adding a new user into the system can be done simply by generating and assigning a
new ID to the new user and publishing public data according to that user’s access
authority. Assume a user is added to the security class and has access authorities R in
short time periods t1 and t 2 . The following modifications are then needed to add this new
user into the system:
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1. Generate a new ID   1  for the new user;
2. Assign ID to the user; and
3. Generate and publish p( ID)sR ,  .
3

3.2.5

Delete an existing user from the system

To delete a user from the system, all of the data that the user is able to obtain needs
to be updated. Assume that a user who is in security class R and has access authorities in
short time periods t1 and t 2 is removed from the security class R and no longer has
these access authorities. We will show that no other users will be affected in the process
of doing such changes through the use of UDTLEBC. We now define the removed user
by ID 0 and the other users who are in the security class R and have access authorities in
short time periods t1 and t 2 by IDi , so that i  1,2,3,... . We will show that the removed
user ID 0 would have no effect on each user IDi and that the amendments can be done on
the central authority side without participation from affected users.
Since user ID 0 previously had full accessibility to the entire system, the following
modifications are needed to remove user ID 0 from the system:
1. For security class R , regenerate sM ,

3



1 ;






2. For security class R , M and N , reselect k R ,t1  0,1 , k R ,t2  0,1 , k M ,t1  0,1 ,






k M ,t2  0,1 , k N ,t1  0,1 , and k N ,t2  0,1 ;
3. Update p( IDi ) sR ,$

3

& % ID !S R ,# "
i

3

for each user IDi ; and
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4. Update p( sR ,

3

) ku ,t 

 

s R ,3

kv ,t for each new key.





Thus, no matter what the change is, the ID assigned to users shall not be required to
be updated and all changes can be accomplished from the side of central authority.
Interactions with users are only needed in those cases when new users are added into the
system. The users can obtain updated keys by using both the ID they once kept and all
of the updated public data, allowing for ease of access without confusion.
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CHAPTER 4. UDTLEBC: SECURITY PROOF

This chapter is designed to offer evidence regarding the security of the UDTLEBC.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, this chapter presents definitions of security
with respect to time-bound hierarchical keys and symmetric encryption schemes. Then,
based on these definitions, the security level of TLEBC is introduced. After that, by
comparing the differences which arise between UDTLEBC and TLEBC, it will be shown
that UDTLEBC is as secure as TLEBC if the symmetric encryption scheme employed is
as secure with respect to plaintext indistinguishability.

4.1

Definitions of Security and the Security of TLEBC

This section introduces related definitions of security that are used in [12] to prove
the security of TLEBC, which might also be used to prove the security of UDTLEBC.
To ensure the security of access control, users should not be able to access a class
during a specific time period if they are not authorized. Av is used to denote the set that
u  V : u  v , for any v  V , where V is the set of security classes. That is to say, for

every class u  V and time period t T , the key ku ,t should not be achieved by users in
class such that u  Av and users in class v’ such that u  Av ' but authorized during a
combination of time periods

such that t

. The key ku ,t should also be protected
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against the coalition of these unauthorized users. The set  u ,    V  P : u  Av or t    is
used to present these unauthorized users, denoted by Fu ,t .
When talking about the security of the time-bound hierarchical key management
scheme, two different security goals are being considered at this point: security with
respect to key indistinguishability and security against key recovery. These two security
goals describe the security of the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme. The
key indistinguishability postulates that an adversary can learn no information about a key
of which the adversary does not have access. The key recovery claims that an adversary
is not able to compute any key for which the adversary does not have access. The timebound hierarchical key management scheme achieves these two security goals with
respect to both static and adaptive adversaries, where static adversaries randomly choose
a security class to attack and adaptive adversaries choose a specific security class to
attack based primarily on that information the adversary actively sought or “jockeyed”
for before the attack.
More precisely, regarding the behavior of these varied adversaries, a static adversary
is allowed to access private information sv , such that v,

Fu ,t and public information.

An algorithm Corruptu ,t is used to denote the process that extracting secret values sv ,
has been associated with pairs v,

Fu ,t . The corr is used to denote the output of

Corrupt u ,t ( s ) , based on the private information s generated by Gen .
On the other hand, an adaptive adversary is allowed to access any number of users’
private information of it’s choice in advance and then chooses a security class u which it
desires to attack and the time period t in which it wants the attack to be approached.
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There are two other notions associated to the definition of security. The first is the
idea of the probabilistic algorithm and experimentation. If A .,.,... is a probabilistic
algorithm, then a  A x, y,... denotes a running algorithm A with inputs x, y,... where
the probability of the outcome a is like the flipping of the coins of A. If X is a set, then

x  X is a denotation that selects an element uniformly from set X and assigns the
value it to x. In another case, " " denotes a simple assignment. The second is the
concept of negligibility. A function f is negligible if for every polynomial p (.) there
exists an N such that for the integer n  N it holds that f n

1
.
pn

Basing on the concepts illustrated above, the security level of the time-bound
hierarchical key management scheme can be categorized into four types (See Appendix A,
Definitions 3, 4, 5, and 6 for more detailed definitions of this security)[12]:
1. Security of key indistinguishability with respect to static adversaries (IND-ST),
2. Security of key indistinguishability with respect to adaptive adversaries (IND-AD),
3. Security against key recovery with respect to static adversaries (REC-ST), and
4. Security against key recovery with respect to adaptive adversaries (REC-AD).

Among these four definitions of security, some notions of security then apply to
others. Four theorems are proven in [12] with the purpose to illustrate the relationships
between these four notions of security, and they are organized in Figure 4.1.
Relationships between the four notions are proven by four theorems. (See Appendix B for
detailed introductions to the four theorems). It could be observed that adaptive
adversaries do not have more advantages than do their static adversaries, so if a key
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management scheme is seen to be secure with respect to its static adversaries, it shall also
be secure with regards to its adaptive adversaries. It could also be observed that the
security of key indistinguishability implies security against key recovery, but not vice
versa. According to these two results, the security of IND-ST implies all of the other
three types of securities, so that any hierarchical scheme which has the security of the
IND-ST may be said to be secure in the sense of all four types of security.

Figure 4.1 Relationships between Security Notions
The security of a symmetric encryption scheme used in UDTLEBC is also important
because it is a core element to the construction of the UDTLEBC. The security for both
TLEBC and UDTLEBC depends on the plaintext indistinguishability of the symmetric
encryption scheme used in them. The plaintext distinguishability means that an adversary
cannot differentiate between two plaintexts after they are encrypted. In other words, the
encryption shall release no information regarding the plaintext that has been encrypted.
The definition of the security of a symmetric encryption scheme is given by Ateniese et
al.:

Definition 7 [IND-P1-C0]. Let

   , , D 

let  be a security parameter. Let A

 A1 ,

be a symmetric encryption scheme and

A2  be an adversary that has access to the
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encryption oracle only during the first stage of the attack and never has access to the
decryption oracle. Consider the following two experiments:
Experiment Exp IND
,A
key 

P1 C 0 1

 P1 C 0  0 
(1 ) Experiment ExpIND
(1 )
,A

1 

key   1 

 x0 , x1 , state  

. 

A1 key 1 

y   key  x1 
d



 x0 , x1 , state  



.

A1 key 1 

y   key  x0 

A2 1 , y, state 

d

return d



A2 1 , y, state 

return d

The advantage of A is defined as:
Adv!IND
,A

P1 C 0

"
1  

Pr Exp!IND
,A

P1 C 0 1

(1" )  1 Pr Exp!IND
,A

P1 C 0 0

"
1   1

The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0 (plaintext
indistinguishability against an adversary whose time complexity is the polynomial in
#

IND' P1'C 0 &
$1 % is negligible.
) if the advantage function Adv( , A

The state in the experiment is some state information that could help the
attack in the second stage. x0 and x1 are plaintext selected by the adversary and sent
to the central authority. One of these is then encrypted by the central authority, and
the ciphertext y relayed back to the adversary. The adversary will return 0 if the
adversary posits that ciphertext y is encrypted by x0 and 1 if the adversary posits
that ciphertext y is encrypted by x1 . [12]

4.2

Security of UDTLEBC

This section illustrates how UDTLEBC is secure in the sense of IND-ST if the
symmetric encryption scheme used is secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0. In order to
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provide evidence for this statement, we will first prove that UDTLEBC is as secure as
TLEBC if the symmetric encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0.
Theorem 5. If the symmetric encryption scheme

 

K , E , D  is secure in the sense of

IND-P1-C0, then the UDTLEBC is as secure as TLEBC.
Proof.
By comparing the construction of TLEBC and UDTLEBC, it could be observed that
UDTLEBC has an extra element for the mapping from user identity ID to secret values

sv , . In the algorithm Gen1 , G , P  , when compared to TLEBC, UDTLEBC generates an
extra part of public information p( ID ) sv ,



E ID S v , , while the other parts are identical as


those found in TLEBC. In the algorithm Der1 , G, P, u, v,  , sv, , t , pub , UDTLEBC has

taken extra steps to compute the value sv , by sv,



DID  pIDsv ,   , while sv , is stored

directly in TLEBC case. After obtaining the value sv , , the concluding steps of
UDTLEBC are identical to those taken with TLEBC. The only difference between
TLEBC and UDTLEBC is found in the generation and usage of the public information
p( ID ) sv ,



E ID S v , . The public information p( ID ) sv ,  is used to compute the value sv , in

UDTLEBC. If the computation of sv , in UDTLEBC does not have any effects on the
usage of the sv , in the further elements of the UDTLEBC, which are identical to TLEBC,
then UDTLEBC must be regarded as a system which is as secure as TLEBC. In other
words, if the value sv , in UDTLEBC, which is associated with the generation and usage
of p( ID)(sv ,

)

to generate sv , , is not distinguishable from the value sv , in TLEBC, then
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UDTLEBC must be as secure as TLEBC. Since the value sv , in TLEBC and UDTLEBC
is generated in an identical manner, then the previous statement implies that UDTLEC
must be found to be as secure as TLEBC if p( ID)(sv , ) similarly provides no information
with regards to sv , .
If p( ID)(sv , ) were to provide any information regarding sv , , then the value sv ,
could not be considered indistinguishable. Assume there is an adversary within two
stages: A   A1 , A2  . Let the ID used to encrypt the value sv ,

be hidden from the

adversary. The adversary is allowed to access to the encryption oracle E ID . during the
first stage. In this stage, the adversary could generate some state information state that
might be helpful and could then be allowed to choose two values, sv ,
would require that the adversary could not encrypt sv ,
information state . Then, either one of the sv ,

'
and sv, . This

'
or sv, and store it in state

'
and sv, will be chosen randomly and

encrypted by E ID . and a ciphertext y shall be generated as challenge. In the second
stage, the adversary will lose its access to the encryption oracle. The ciphertext y is sent
back to the adversary and the adversary has to decide whether the ciphertext y is
'
encrypted by sv , or sv, . If the adversary believes that the ciphertext y is encrypted by

sv , , the adversary should reply 1. If the adversary believes that the ciphertext y is
encrypted by sv , , the adversary should reply 0. If we continue these experiment many
times, the number of responses from the first should differ from the number of responses
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from the second. Let

 

K , E , D  be a symmetric scheme and



be the security

parameter which is used in UDTLEBC, considering the following experiment:
IND #UDT # 0 
UDT 1 
(1 )
Experiment ExpIND
(1 ) Experiment Exp$ , A
,A

ID  ! 1 

ID   1 
'

sv , , sv , , state  

p( ID )( Sv ,
d



)   ID

A1 ID . 1 

sv , 

A2 1 , p( ID )( Sv , ) , state

return d

'

sv , , sv , , state  

p( ID )( S '

v ,

d



)



A1" ID . 1 

'
ID  v , 

s

A2 1 , p( ID )( S ' ) , state 
v ,

return d

The advantage of A is defined as:
IND +UDT +1 .
+UDT +UDT + 0 Adv ,IND
(1 ) ) 1(* Pr 'Exp ,IND
%1 & ) Pr 'Exp , , A
%1 & ) 1(
,A
,A

IND P1 C 0
If the advantage of A that Adv3 , A2 2 /11 0 is negligible, then the value sv ,4 should

be indistinguishable. This implies that the public information p( ID)(sv ,5 ) shall also provide
no information regarding the value sv ,4 . So, any usage of value sv ,4 will not be affected
with the generation and usage of p( ID)(sv ,5 ) to compute sv ,4 . Since sv ,4 is generated in
identical way in TLEBC and UDTLEBC, and there is no way to distinguish a value sv ,4
from another value sv ,4 associated with public information p( ID)(sv ,5 ) . The value sv ,4 in
UDTLEBC is not distinguishable from the value sv ,4 in TLEBC. In other words, the
computation of sv ,4 in UDTLEBC does not have any effects on the usage of the sv ,4 in
additional elements of UDTLEBC, which are identical to those found in TLEBC, so that
the system of UDTLEBC must be as secure as that operating within TLEBC.
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Comparing our experiment to the experiment within Definition 7, it could be
observed that we have only changed the key to ID and the plaintext to value sv , . The
process of our experiment is indistinguishable from the process of a plaintext experiment.
As long as the security of the symmetric encryption scheme with respect to plaintext
indistinguishability holds, the advantage of the adversary in our experiment will
necessarily be negligible. The theorem should be regarded as proven.
The security of TLEBC is proven by Ateniese et al. with the following theorem:

Theorem 6. If the encryption scheme

   , D,  

is secure in the sense of IND-

P1-C0, then the TLEBC is secure in the sense of IND-ST.[12]

According to Theorem 6, since the TLEBC is secure in the sense of IND-ST if the
symmetric encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0, then the UDTLEBC
will also be secure in the sense of IND-ST if the symmetric encryption scheme is secure
in the sense of IND-P1-C0 because UDTLEBC is as secure as TLEBC when the
symmetric encryption scheme is secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0. Thus, Theorem 7 is
obvious.
Theorem 7. If the encryption scheme

   , D,  

is secure in the sense of IND-P1-C0,

then the TLEBC is secure in the sense of IND-ST.
Since security in the sense of IND-ST implies all other three types of security,
UDTLEBC is secure in the sense of all four types of security which we have defined in
section 4.1.
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CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE TEST METHODOLOGY

5.1

Overview

In this chapter methods for testing the performance of UDTLEBC was demonstrated.
Since the UDTLEBC was built on the basis of TLEBC, the performance of UDTLEBC
was also compared with the performance of TLEBC in order to evaluate how the
proposed modifications would affect the performance. The all the results obtained were
discussed to judge whether the performance of UDTLEBC is acceptable.

5.2

Methodology

As was introduced in second portion of section 2.4, elements of performance were
observed with regard to five aspects: (1) complexity of key updates, (2) complexity of
hierarchical changes, (3) computation overhead or time requirements, (4) private storage
requirements, and (5) public storage requirements.
The private and public storage requirements were computed by the size of storage in
Ateniese et al.’s work [12], so at this point we used the same methods to measure the
comparison. Two elements may lead to failure in the storage requirements. The first
includes the security classes designed by the central authority. The second includes those
time periods decided by the central authority. To test these theories, we used V to
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indicate the set of security classes and T to indicate the set of short time periods. The
size of the storage were shown by giving an expression of the mathematical formula.
Previous works had described the complexity of key updates and the complexity of
hierarchical change by providing examples as to how many steps and storage changes are
required. Specific to our scheme, all of the key updates and hierarchical changes are
about update storage and can be accomplished by the central authority. The complexity of
key updates and complexity of hierarchical change are directly doomed by the public
storage which is required to be changed. Because of this specialty, we used the size of
storage that was required to be updated and which was associated with the key updates
and hierarchical change to evaluate the complexity of the key updates and hierarchical
changes. The size of storage that should be updated shall similarly be designated by a
mathematical formula composited with a V and a T .
Experiments should test the computation overhead of UDTLEBC. Experiments are
proceeded with two main objectives. The first objective is that we want to see whether
the time cost of key derivation of UDTLEBC exceeded the simple human reaction time.
We would like to see whether the processes of key derivation could be noticed by users
and affected the user experiences. In this case we considered the simple human reaction
time only, in which only one stimulus and one response existed [47]. The mean simple
visual reaction time had been believed to be 180-200 msec by many researchers [48], so
we were going to observe that whether the time cost of key derivation of UDTLEBC will
bypass 180 msec. If not, the conclusion that UDTLEBC is efficient in the aspects of key
derivation could be confirmed because the time cost of the process is not noticeable by
users. The second objective is that we want to see how our modification, that building
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UDTLEBC by adding new capabilities and steps to TLEBC, affected the computation
overhead. The computation overhead is the computation amount or time required for key
derivation. The following hypothesis is being considered:
H 0 : The computation overhead of the UDTLEBC is twice of the computation
overhead of TLEBC.
We had doubled the time costs in the TLEBC case and used non-parametric statistic
to determine whether the distribution of time in the UDTLEBC case was significantly
different to the distribution of time doubled in the TLEBC case, which provided answers
to our hypothesis.
To allow for the accuracy of the experiments with the UDTLEBC, a demo was built
to simulate the processes of key derivation from the UDTLEBC, and the time of such
processes was recorded in order to observe the necessary computation time. The
processes of key derivation for the UDTLEBC were introduced in section 3.1.

Figure 5.1 UDTLEBC Key Derivation Processes
Figure 5.1 illustrates the brief processes of key derivation for the UDTLEBC. When
a device or user requests a key from the server, the server will judge what information is
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required in order to compute which key that the device or user actually requires, to obtain
the information from the database, and to then send such information back to the device
or user. At that point, the device or user shall be able to compute the key it requires by
using the ID and information it has received. The device or user has the advantages of the
ID, which is a secret and private value distributed to said device or user when it is added
into the system. (Results according to this process are shown from Figure 6.1 to Figure
6.12.)
To compare the performance of the UDTLEBC with the TLEBC, a demo of the
TLEBC was also built to simulate the processes of key derivation from the TLEBC. The
processes of key derivation from the TLEBC were introduced in section 2.6. Instead of an
ID, a secret value was stored on the personal device.

Figure 5.2 TLEBC Key Derivation Processes
Figure 5.2 illustrates the brief processes of key derivation from the TLEBC. Similar
to the processes of key derivation with a UDTLEBC, when a device or user requests a
key from the server, the server will judge what information is required, obtain such
information from the database, and send it back to the device or user. In this time, instead
of employing an ID as was done with the UDTLEBC, a secret value shall be stored on the
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device and will be used to compute the key requested. This value is also distributed to the
device or user while the device or user is added into the system. This value is not private
but is shared with all users with the same access authorities. (Results according to this
process are shown from Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.12.)
As both the symmetric encryption scheme and the device used might be found to
affect the performance of the key derivation in this experiment, the following variables
had been considered: the chosen symmetric encryption scheme, the operation mode of
encryption, the chosen key size, and the testing environment or the configuration of the
device.
Two testing environments were used. The performance were test on both the real
device and the emulator. This scheme only used AES as the symmetric encryption
scheme since the AES was viewed as the most popular, easily obtained, and provablysecure symmetric encryption scheme that existed. AES has three available key lengths.
Since we were going to perform these experiments on Android operation systems, a key
length of 128 bits had only been considered because many Android operation systems
would not support key lengths of 196 or 256 bits. Similarly, we had only tested the CBC,
CFB, and OFB modes of encryption, because the CTR mode was not supported by many
of the Android operation systems. We also abandoned the ECB mode due to security
concerns. These experiments were going to test the time required to run the processes of
key derivation for both the UDTLEBC and TLEBC. The processes of key derivation
were simulated 100 times with the purpose to avoid the influence of outliers.
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Box-and-whisker plot diagrams were used for the results. Thus, the distribution of
the computation time (overhead) could be discovered directly and one could judge
whether the performance was acceptable.
We also tested the operation time of the entire processes of data transfer by using
UDTLEBC. This is designed to evaluate whether we can expand the usage of UDTLEBC
not only for key management but also for data transfer protection. In this case, a piece of
data was encrypted, transferred, decrypted, and, finally, displayed. Since the processes of
key derivation were also involved in the processes of data transfer, the same variables
and methods which were used for key derivation should also be used here. In this case we
only performed the simulation on the Samsung GT-i9108 device.
During experimentation, five lengths of data were considered: 1Kbit, 10Kbit,
100Kbit, and 1Mbit, and 10Mbit. Data lengths longer than 10Mbit were not tested
because these are too long to be transferred in one communication. The time required for
transfer of these data lengths were recorded in order to evaluate how the UDTLEBC
performs if it was used to transfer data. Working with control groups, the times required
to transfer data of the same length directly was also tested. With this method, we
determined how much extra time was needed to provide protection to data transfer
through use of the UDTLEBC.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the processes of the data transfer which we have simulated.
When a device or user requests data from the server, the server will judge the specific
encryption key that should be used to encrypt the data and determine what information is
needed for the device or user to compute the encryption key by key derivation. Then, the
server will obtain that data, encryption key, and information required in order to compute
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the encryption key from the database. After encrypting the data with the encryption key,
the server will send the encrypted data and relevant information for key derivation to the
device or user. After receiving the encrypted data and the information of key derivation,
the device or user will first proceed with the key derivation to obtain the key and will
then proceed with decryption through use of the computed key to obtain the data required.
(Process results are illustrated in Figure 6.3, Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure
6.7).

Figure 5.3 UDTLEBC Data Transfer Processes

5.3

Independent Variables and Constants

The independent variables were of different configurations during the experiments.
We expected to observe how the performances are going to be affected. Though many
factors were considered during the experiments, according to the capability of both the
Android and the device or emulator used, those factors which varied during the
experiments were merely partial, while the rest of the factors had remained as constants.
For the experiments of key derivation, varied configurations included: the different timebound hierarchical key management scheme, the different operation mode of encryption,
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and the testing environment or the configuration of the device. The encryption scheme
AES and key length of 128bit were both treated as constants by this author as they had
not varied during these experiments. For the experiments of data transfer, varied
configurations included: the different operation mode of encryption and the different data
length transferred. The device Samsung GT-i9108, the AES encryption scheme, and the
key length of 128 bit were treated as constants for these did not vary during the
experiments.
5.4

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables were the computation times observed in varied
configurations of the experiment. These computation times demonstrated directly how
UDTLEBC performs in each varied configuration for either the key derivation or data
transfer.
5.5

Internal Validity

Unmanipulated factors, such as noise, might override the influence of the
manipulated variables. It was still apparent that one may consider how UDTLEBC
performs by observing the computation time with these factors. With regard to
unmanipulated factors, such as noise, the manipulated variables which had a significant
influence on performance would still exist, and such influences could be considered more
trustworthy because these influences existed even in situations involving the
unmanipulated factors, such as noise.
5.6

External Validity

All of the results had been obtained by using a convenient emulator and a
convenient device, so that additional threats to external validity should be considered.

55
Detailed information regarding the emulator and the device had been mentioned, so if one
uses different configurations one can predict the results by comparing the capability of
the emulator or device one is using. The emulator and the device used in this thesis was
set to be at a level far lower when compared to the average level of devices used in 2014,
so better results could be expected if different emulators or devices were used. So, if the
performance levels established in this thesis were found to be acceptable, it was expected
that said levels should be acceptable in most cases.
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS

6.1

Performance of Complexities and Storage Requirements

The Table 6.1 provides a summary of the performance of UDTLEBC on
complexities and storage requirements. The results and expression of mathematical
formula of TLEBC is obtained from Ateniese et al.’s paper [12]. Specifically, V is used
to indicate the set of security classes, N is used to indicate the set of users, and T is used
to indicate the set of short time periods.
From the construction of UDTLEBC, it is obvious that only one piece of private
storage is required for this system. The private storage requirements of UDTLEBC are
identical to those of TLEBC. When compared with TLEBC, UDTLEBC only demands
extra public information in order to successfully realize the mapping from users to secret
values. Each user has one mapping to one specific secret value, so N

extra public

3
storage is necessary. As compared to V 2 T , the N extra public storage is actually

rather small. If one imagines a small system with just 10 security classes, 10 short time
periods, and 10 users, the percentage of N extra public storage may be seen as merely:

N
2

3

V T  N



10
 0.01%
10  103  10
2
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Table 6.1 Performance Comparison Table of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
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Even though UDTLEBC requires the N extra public storage, this does not appear
to greatly affect its performance in terms of public storage requirements when compared
to those of the TLEBC. By using the formula of public storage, one could also observe
that neither UDTLEBC nor TLEBC performs very well from this perspective. For
instance, according to the example shown above, a small system with merely 10 security
classes, 10 short time periods, and 10 users would require, at most, V 2  T  N 10010
3

public records to be stored. This is a deficiency for both UDTLEBC and TLEBC. This
deficiency requires improvements in future work. As the author of this thesis has noted,
within a BYOD environment, the performance of public storage is not interpreted as an
important factor, although it still may have significant implications for the future usage of
UDTLEBC.
The complexities of key updates and hierarchical change both depend upon the
existent relationships between secret values and keys. According to the construction of
UDTLEBC, it becomes obvious that the extra layer of users simply adds to the number of
relationships between users and secret values and does not affect the actual relationships
between secret values and keys. So the complexities of key updates and hierarchical
change in UDTLEBC may be viewed as quite similar to the complexities of key updates
and hierarchical change in TLEBC. UDTLEBC has one distinct advantage when it is
compared to TLEBC in that it does not require actual interactions with the users while
performing all of these changes. Changes to the size of V  T due to the complexity of
key updates and to T

3

as a result of the complexity of hierarchical change seem to be

great, but they are only those changes which occur in the worst cases. That situation in
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which V

T would arise assumes that a root key has changed and T

3

assumes that the

changes are being made to top security classes within the partial order hierarchy. Once
we add the advantage where all of the changes can be made on server’s side, without any
unnecessary interactions with the users, so that all changes can be achieved within
predefined policies, it then becomes fair to expect that the key updates and hierarchical
changes can be accomplished efficiently within our real world parameters.

6.2

Performance of Computation Overhead

The time distributions of TLEBC and UDTLEBC were recorded and compared to
see the computation overhead of the UDTLEBC. We considered 3 encryption modes
including CBC, CFB and OFB. Two devices were considered. One device was the
SAMSUNG GT-i9108 with the operating system Android 2.3.5, I9108ZMKI5 and CPU
Samsung S5PV310, Cortex-A9, and a RAM of 1GB. Another testing environment was
simulated by the Java SDK. The Java SDK simulated a platform of a 3.2" QVGA ADP2
with an operating system for an Android 2.2, the CPU ARM (armeabi), and a 512 MB
RAM. In total the time distribution of TLEBC and UDTLEBC were considered in 6 cases.
Figure 6.1 shows the time distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
in the case of using encryption scheme AES, key length of 128 bits, device GT-i9108,
and CBC encryption mode. One can observe that the average time of key derivation of
UDTLEBC is 30-40 msec, which is far from the simple human visual reaction time 180
msec. It can be confirmed that the computation overhead of UDTLEBC in this case is
efficient because the time cost of the processes could not be noticed by users. The result
of the non-parametric test is shown in Figure 6.2. Our Null hypothesis was retained.
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Figure 6.1 Time Distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC in the Case of
Device GT-i9108 and CBC Encryption Mode

Figure 6.2 Non-parametric Test for Distribution of Time in the Case of Device GT-i9108
and CBC Encryption Mode
Figure 6.3 shows the time distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
in the case of using encryption scheme AES, key length of 128 bits, device GT-i9108,
and CFB encryption mode. One can observe that the average time of key derivation of
UDTLEBC is also 30-40 msec, which is far from the simple human visual reaction time
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180 msec. It can be confirmed that the computation overhead of UDTLEBC in this case
is efficient because the time cost of the processes could not be noticed by users. The
result of the non-parametric test is shown in Figure 6.4. Our Null hypothesis was rejected.

Figure 6.3 Time Distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC in the
Case of Device GT-i9108 and CFB Encryption Mode

Figure 6.4 Non-parametric Test for Distribution of Time in the Case of Device GT-i9108
and CFB Encryption Mode
Figure 6.5 shows the time distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
in the case of using encryption scheme AES, key length of 128 bits, device GT-i9108,
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and OFB encryption mode. One can observe that the average time of key derivation of
UDTLEBC is also 30-40 msec, which is far from the simple human visual reaction time
180 msec. It can be confirmed that the computation overhead of UDTLEBC in this case
is efficient because the time cost of the processes could not be noticed by users. The
result of the non-parametric test is shown in Figure 6.6. Our Null hypothesis was retained.

Figure 6.5 Time Distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC in the Case of
Device GT-i9108 and OFB Encryption Mode

Figure 6.6 Non-parametric Test for Distribution of Time in the Case of Device GT-i9108
and OFB Encryption Mode
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Figure 6.7 shows the time distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
in the case of using encryption scheme AES, key length of 128 bits, emulator Java SDK,
and CBC encryption mode. One can observe that the average time of key derivation of
UDTLEBC is 200-350 msec, which exceed the simple human visual reaction time 180
msec. It can be confirmed that the computation overhead of UDTLEBC in this case is not
efficient because the time cost of the processes could be noticed by users. The result of
the non-parametric test is shown in Figure 6.8. Our Null hypothesis was retained.

Figure 6.7 Time Distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC in the Case of
Java SDK and CBC Encryption Mode
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Figure 6.8 Non-parametric Test for Distribution of Time in the Case of Java SDK and
CBC Encryption Mode

Figure 6.9 Time Distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC in the Case of
Java SDK and CFB Encryption Mode
Figure 6.9 shows the time distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
in the case of using encryption scheme AES, key length of 128 bits, emulator Java SDK,
and CFB encryption mode. One can observe that the average time of key derivation of
UDTLEBC is also 200-350 msec, which exceed the simple human visual reaction time
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180 msec. It can be confirmed that the computation overhead of UDTLEBC in this case
is not efficient because the time cost of the processes could be noticed by users. The
result of the non-parametric test is shown in Figure 6.10. Our Null hypothesis was
rejected.

Figure 6.10 Non-parametric Test for Distribution of Time in the Case of Java SDK and
CFB Encryption Mode
Figure 6.11 shows the time distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC
in the case of using encryption scheme AES, key length of 128 bits, emulator Java SDK,
and OFB encryption mode. One can observe that the average time of key derivation of
UDTLEBC is 200-350 msec, which exceed the simple human visual reaction time 180
msec. It can be confirmed that the computation overhead of UDTLEBC in this case is not
efficient because the time cost of the processes could be noticed by users. The result of
the non-parametric test is shown in Figure 6.12. Our Null hypothesis was retained.

66

Figure 6.11 Time Distribution of key derivation of TLEBC and UDTLEBC in the Case of
Java SDK and OFB Encryption Mode

Figure 6.12 Non-parametric Test for Distribution of Time in the Case of Java SDK and
OFB Encryption Mode
It could be observed that the Java SDK emulator performs much less effectively
than does the Samsung GT-i9108 device. While the performance of UDTLEBC is
efficient in the case of Samsung GT-i9108, the performance of UDTLEB is not efficient
in the case of using the emulator Java SDK. It could also be observed that the standard
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deviation (SD) of the computation overhead for the Java SDK emulator is quite large. In
the case of the OFB mode, the deviation is even greater than half of the mean. So one
could conclude that the results generated through the use of the Java SDK are not
trustworthy. From the other side, the Samsung GT-i9108 is a “real” device while the Java
SDK is considered an “emulator”, so the results gathered by the GT-i9108 are more
likely to reflect the real performance of the computation overhead. From this perspective,
we shall abandon the results gathered from the Java SDK and select the results obtained
from the GT-i9108 device. In addition, the Samsung GT-i9108 is a device that came on
the market at end of 2011, so it may already be viewed by many as an “old and used”
device. For devices which have entered the market after 2011, a better performance ratio
could be expected. With this fact in mind, confidence may also be generated that the
performance of UDTLEBC will be even more acceptable on phones that have appeared
on the market after 2011. Thus, the performance of UDTLEBC in the aspect of
computation overhead is believed efficient.
With the results gathered in the non-parametric test, we have failed to reject our
hypothesis in the CBC and OFB encryption mode cases, and we have succeeded to reject
our hypothesis in the CFB encryption mode case. Thus, our results support our
hypothesis that the computation overhead of the UDTLEBC is twice the computation
overhead of TLEBC in both the CBC and OFB encryption mode cases, while they do not
similarly support the hypothesis in the OFB encryption mode case.
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6.3

Performance of Data Transfer

The results of performance of the entire processes of data transfer are shown from
Figure 6.13 to Figure 6.17. Table 6.2 illustrates the varied median times of data transfer
performance.
Table 6.2 Median Time of Data Transfer Performance Test
No Encryption

CBC Mode

CFB Mode

OFB Mode

1Kbit

14 ms

45.5 ms

43.5 ms

45 ms

10Kbit

16 ms

47 ms

49 ms

52 ms

100Kbit

50 ms

105 ms

102 ms

104 ms

1Mbit

322 ms

456 ms

432.5 ms

444 ms

10Mbit

7.23 s

10.81 s

10.84 s

10. 30 s

Figure 6.13 Data Transfer Performance for Data Length of 1Kbit
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Figure 6.13 shows the data transfer performance for a data length of 1Kbit on the
Samsung GT-i9108 device. These results have been achieved by following the processes
in Figure 5.3. The time to transfer the data directly is around 14 ms. To transfer data by
using UDTLEBC for protection, the median time is 45.5 ms for the CBC mode, 43.5 ms
for the CFB mode, and 45 ms for the OFB Mode.

Figure 6.14 Data Transfer Performance for Data Lengths of 10Kbit
Figure 6.14 shows the data transfer performance for a data length of 10Kbit on the
Samsung GT-i9108 device. The results are achieved by following the processes
illustrated in Figure 5.3. The calculated time to directly transfer the data is approximately
16 ms. In order to transfer data by using UDTLEBC for protection, the median time
increases to 47 ms increases to with the CBC mode, 49 ms with the CFB mode, and 52
ms with the OFB Mode. When one compares the results of this figure with the results of
Figure 6.13, one should notice that although the data length has been extended by 10

70
times, the time of data transfer has only slightly increased, with the multiple nowhere
near that of 10. One possible explanation is that most of the time involved is the actual
costs of the embellishment of the communication, so that a mere increase in the data
length itself should not affect the actual time of data transfer.

Figure 6.15 Data Transfer Performance for Data Lengths of 100Kbit
Figure 6.15 shows the data transfer performance for data lengths of 100Kbit on the
Samsung GT-i9108 device. These results are achieved by following the processes shown
in Figure 5.3. In this case, the time to transfer the data directly is around 50 ms. In order
to directly transfer the gathered data by using UDTLEBC for protection, the median time
is 105 ms for the CBC mode, 102 ms for the CFB mode, and 104 ms for the OFB Mode.
When one compares the results gathered from this case to the results from the previous
two cases, one could observe that the time required to transfer data increases a great deal.
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With this information in hand, we can conclude that this data length is long enough to
affect the time of data transfer.
It is interesting to mention that the ratio of transferring data by using UDTLEBC as
a protection measure as opposed to transferring data directly is decreased with the
increase of data length. This trend can be better observed by viewing Table 6.2. For data
lengths of between 1Kbit and 10Kbit, it could be observed that the time to transfer data
while using UDTLEBC as a protection becomes tripled in relationship to the time
required to transfer the data directly. But for data lengths of 100Kbit, the time to transfer
data through the use of UDTLEBC as a protection is only twice as the length of time
required for direct data transfer.

Figure 6.16 Data Transfer Performance for Data Lengths of 1Mbit
Figure 6.16 illustrates the data transfer performance for a data length of 1Mbit on
the Samsung GT-i9108 device. These results are achieved by following the processes
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shown in Figure 5.3. With this case, the time to transfer the data directly is approximately
322 ms. When one shifts to transferring data by using UDTLEBC for protection, the
median time increases to 456 ms for the CBC mode, 432.5 ms for the CFB mode, and
444 ms for the OFB Mode. As compared to the previous three figures, we can now see
that the increase of data length has caused an even greater impact on time costs. More
importantly, the ratio of transferring data through the use of UDTLEBC as a protection
for direct data transfer has further decreased.

Figure 6.17 Data Transfer Performance for Data Lengths of 10Mbit
Figure 6.17 illustrates the data transfer performance for a data length of 10Mbit on
the Samsung GT-i9108 device. These results have been achieved by following the
processes shown in Figure 5.3. The time to transfer the data directly is approximately
7.23 seconds. In order to transfer data by using UDTLEBC as a protection device, the
median time further increases 10.81 seconds for the CBC mode, 10.84 seconds for the
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CFB mode, and 10.30 seconds for the OFB Mode. In this case it could be observed that
the time cost is much increased when compared to the previous results. The time required
to transfer a data length of 10Mbit is over 20 times more than that required for a data
length of 1Mbit, so additional factors (beyond data length) should be considered. One
possible answer is the flow control of the device. In communication, flow control is used
to manage the rate of transmission between two nodes. When a package is lost, the rate of
transmission may be poorly controlled, thereby requiring extra time to transfer the data.
Another possible answer is the computation capabilities of the device. To manage a data
length of 10Mbit in one communication requires that a device has extra memory, which
may add to the burdens on that device or may be something that the device does not have
available.
One can observe the differences existent between the direct transfer of data and the
choice to transfer data by using UDTLEBC as protection device becomes gradually
reduced with the gradual increase of the data length. While transferring a data length of
1Kbit, the time costs of transferring this data through the use of UDTLEBC triples the
cost of transferring the data directly.By increasing this data length to 10Mbit, the ratio
then decreases to less than 1.5.
One reasonable answer to this factor is that the ratio of the time spent on the
encryption to that of the time spent on the data transfer has decreased. More precisely, the
time costs for transferring the data directly can be divided into two categories, i.e. (1) the
time to establish the communication and (2) the time to transfer the data. The time
required to establish the communication is similar in all instances, but the time necessary
to transfer the data increases with the increase of the data length. On the other hand, the

74
time costs of transferring the data by UDTLEBC as a protection device can be divided
into three categories, i.e. (1) the time to establish the communication, (2) the time to
transfer the data, and (3) the time to encrypt and decrypt the data. The time to establish
the communication is also a stable element, but the times required to transfer, encrypt,
and decrypt the data will be increased with the increase of data length. If we set the data
length to be x , the average time to establish a communication to be c , the time cost to
transfer data to be f x  , and the time to encrypt and decrypt data to be g x  , the ratio r
of transferring data by using UDTLEBC as protection to transferring data directly will be:
r

c  f x   g x 
c  f x

Since r is decreased with the increase of x , it means that f x  increases faster than
g  x  , and it means that with the increase of the data length, on the ratio perspective, the

influence of using UDTLEBC as a protection will be necessarily decreased.
In our experiments we have tested data length up to 10Mbit, which is a little higher
than that required to transfer a file the size of 1Mbyte. Thus, in order to transfer any files
which are less than 1Mbyte, we may expect a reduction in at least 50% of the extra time
if UDTLEBC is used to protect the data transfer. At last, with good network conditions
or through the use of a more powerful device, for any file of more than 1Mbyte, this ratio
is expected to decrease further.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

Results had proven that a provably-secure and efficient new time-bound hierarchical
key management scheme with the capability of user differentiation could be built to
circumvent the problems of privacy and costs that the current time-bound hierarchical
key management schemes faced in the BYOD environment. The proof had been
accomplished by constructing the new scheme: the User-Differentiated Two-Layer
Encryption-Based Scheme (UDTLEBC) and by proving its capability for user
differentiation and security of key indistinguishability and against key recovery with
respect to both static and adaptive adversaries. With its capability of user differentiation,
it had been shown that when changes were required to be done for one user, no other
users would be affected and all processes would be completed on the server’s side
without interactions with users so that a personal devices used in a BYOD environment
would no longer cause potential privacy and cost issues.
The efficiency of the UDTLEBC had been evaluated by comparing its performance
with that of a prototype, the time-bound hierarchical key management scheme Two-Layer
Encryption-Based Scheme (TLEBC). It had been shown that, in the perspectives of the
complexity of key updates and the complexity of the hierarchical change, the UDTLEBC
performed better than does the TLEBC because it did not require interactions with users
to proceed with the changes, and its performance in these two perspectives were believed
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acceptable. In the private storage requirement, UDTLEBC is noted to perform as well as
TLEBC and required only one piece of private storage. In the perspectives of public
storage requirement, UDTLEBC also performed as well as TLEBC, but neither
UDTLEBC nor TLEBC performed particularly well in this perspective because they both
required a great deal of public storage. The public storage was not believed to be
providing a great influence in a BYOD environment by the author of this thesis, so this
deficiency was considered bearable. Improvements were required in future work. In the
perspective of computation overhead, UDTLEBC required as twice as much time on
average as did the TLEBC to do the key derivation, but it was still very efficient in terms
of usage because it only required an additional 20-30 milliseconds to proceed with the
key derivation. According to the results gathered in this thesis, the UDTLEBC was
believed to be both capable and efficient for usage within a BYOD environment.
This thesis had further tested whether we could expand the usage of UDTLEBC into
data transfer protection. These results indicated that for data lengths less than 10Mbits,
transferring data by using UDTLEBC as protection device required at least 1.5 to 3 times
the time required to transfer the data directly. Under good network conditions or through
use of a more powerful device, for any file larger than 1Mbyte, this ratio was expected to
decrease.
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Appendix A

Definitions

All below definitions are intercepted from the work of Ateniese et al.[11]:

Definition 1. A time-bound hierarchical key management scheme for

is a pair of

algorithms Gen, Der  satisfying the following conditions:
1. The information generation algorithm Gen is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as
inputs the security parameter 1 , a graph G  V , E  in

, and the interval-set

 over a

sequence of distinct time periods T, and produces as outputs:
a) A private information su , , for any class u V and any time sequence

;

b) A key ku ,t , for any class u V and any time period t T ;
c) A public information pub .
We denote by s, k , pub  the output of the algorithm Gen where s and k denote the
sequence of private information and of keys, respectively.
2. The key derivation algorithm Der is deterministic polynomial time. It takes as inputs
the security parameter 1 , a graph G  V , E  in

, and the interval-set

 over a

sequence of distinct time periods T, two classes u and v such that v  Au , a time sequence
, a private information su , assigned to class u for the time sequence

 , a time
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period t  , and the public information pub , and produces as output the key kv ,t
assigned to the class v at time period t. We require that for each class u  V , each class
v  Au , each time sequence    , each time period t  , each private information su , ,
each key kv ,t , each public information pub which can be computed by Gen on inputs 1 ,
G, and  , it holds that

Der 1 , G, , u, v,  , su , , t , pub

k v ,t

Definition 2. A symmetric encryption scheme is a triple   , , D  of algorithms
satisfying the following conditions:
1. The key-generation algorithm  is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as input the



security parameter 1 and produces as output a string key.


2. The encryption algorithm  is probabilistic polynomial time. It takes as inputs 1 , a

string key produced by  1  , and a message m  0,1 , and produces as output the
*

ciphertext y.



3. The decryption algorithm D is deterministic polynomial time. It takes as inputs 1 , a


string key produced by  1  , and a ciphertext y, and produces as output a message m.

We require that for any string key which can be output by  1  , for any message
m  0,1 , and for y that can be output by "1! , key, m , we have D#1& , key, y $ % m .
*
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Definition 3 [IND-ST]. Let

be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered

hierarchies, let G  V , E    be a graph, let T be a sequence of distinct time periods, let

 be the interval-set over T, and let Gen, Der  be a time-bound hierarchical key
assignment scheme for

. Let STAT u ,t be a static adversary which attacks a class u V

in a time period t T . Consider the following two experiments:
IND  0 
1 , G,  
Experiment Exp STAT
u ,t

IND 1 
Experiment Exp STAT
1 , G, 
u ,t

s, k , pub   Gen 1 , G , 
corr  Corrupt u ,t s 
d

 STAT u ,t 1 , G, , pub, corr , ku ,t

return d

s, k , pub   Gen1 , G,  
corr  Corrupt u ,t s 
  0,1length k 
d  STAT u ,t 1 , G , , pub, corr , ku ,t 
u ,t

return d

The advantage of STAT u ,t is defined as
IND
IND '1 (
IND ' 0 (
AdvSTAT
1( , G, % ! $ Pr"ExpSTAT
1 , G, % ! $ 1#& Pr"ExpSTAT
1 , G, % ! $ 1#
u ,t
u ,t
u ,t

The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-ST (key indistinguishability against a
static adversary whose time complexity is polynomial in ) ) if the function
IND
*1- , G, , + is negligible
AdvSTAT
u ,t

Definition 4 [IND-AD]. Let

be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered

hierarchies, let G  V , E    be a graph, let T be a sequence of distinct time periods, let

 be the interval-set over T, and let Gen, Der  be a time-bound hierarchical key
assignment scheme for

. Let ADAPT

0 . ADAPT1 , ADAPT2 / be an adaptive adversary
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that is given access to the oracle

 s .

during both stages of the attack, where s is the

private information computed by Gen. Consider the following two experiments:
IND 1
1 , G ,
Experiment Exp ADAPT
u ,t

s , k ,

pub 

Gen1 , G,

(u , t , state)
d

ADAPT2

ADAPT1
s

. 

1

return d



s , k ,


s

.

1

IND  0

Experiment Exp ADAPT
1 , G ,  
u ,t

, G, , pub 

pub   Gen1 , G,  

(u , t , state)  ADAPT1 s . 1 , G, , pub 
length ku ,t 

, G, , pub, u , t , state, ku ,t    0,1
d  ADAPT2 s . 1 , G, , pub, u , t , state,  

return d

Os (.) is a oracle which can provide the adversary knowledge associated with a pair u, t  .
It is required that the ADAPT1 can only output pair u, t  belongs to Fu .t and ADAPT2
cannot query a pair v, " ! such that u # Av and t % $ . The advantage of the scheme is
defined as
IND -1
IND - 0 .
.
.
Adv IND
&1 , G , + ' * Pr (Exp ADAPT &1 , G , + ' * 1) , Pr (Exp ADAPT &1 , G , + ' * 1)
ADAPT

The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of IND-AD (key indistinguishability against
an adaptive adversary whose time complexity is polynomial in / ) if the function
IND
3
Adv ADAPT
01 , G , 2 1 is negligible.

Definition 5 [REC-ST]. Let

4

be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered

hierarchies, let G 9 5V , E 6 8 7 be a graph, let T be a sequence of distinct time periods, let
:

be the interval-set over T, and let ;Gen, Der < be a time-bound hierarchical key

assignment scheme for

4.

Let STAT u ,t be a static adversary which attacks a class u = V

in a time period t % T . Consider the following two experiments:
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REC
Experiment ExpSTAT
1 , G,  
u ,t

s , k ,

pub   Gen 1 , G,  

corr  Corruptu ,t s 
ku' ,t



STAT u ,t 1 , G, , pub, corr 

return ku' ,t
The advantage of STAT u ,t is defined as
REC
'
AdvSTAT
1 , G , P  Pr ku ,t
u ,t

k u ,t

The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of REC-ST (against key recovery with
respect to a static adversary whose time complexity is polynomial in

) if the function

REC

AdvSTAT
1 , G , P  is negligible.
u ,t

Definition 6 [REC-AD]. Let



be a family of graphs corresponding to partially ordered

hierarchies, let G  V , E    be a graph, let T be a sequence of distinct time periods, let


be the interval-set over T, and let Gen, Der  be a time-bound hierarchical key

assignment scheme for

.

Let ADAPT

that is given access to the oracle

 s .

  ADAPT1 ,

ADAPT2  be an adaptive adversary

during both stages of the attack, where s is the

private information computed by Gen. Consider the following two experiments:
IND )1
Experiment Exp ADAPT
1* , G, & !
u ,t

"s , k ,

pub # ' Gen 1* , G, & !

(u, t , state) ' ADAPT1( s $.% 1* , G, &, pub!
ku' ,t

'

ADAPT2( s $.% 1* , G, &, pub, u, t , state!

return ku' ,t
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It is required that the ADAPT1 can only output pair u, t  belongs to Fu .t and ADAPT2
cannot query a pair v,   such that u  Av and t   . The advantage of the scheme is
defined as
REC
AdvADAPT
1 , G, P

Pr ku' ,t

ku ,t

The scheme is said to be secure in the sense of REC-AD (against key recovery with
respect to an adaptive adversary whose time complexity is polynomial in  ) if the
REC

function Adv ADAPT
1 , G , P  is negligible.
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Appendix B

Theorems

All below theorems are intercepted from the work of Ateniese et al.[11]:

 be a family of graphs corresponding to partially
ordered hierarchies. A time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme for  is secure in
Theorem 1 [IND-ST

IND-AD] Let

the sense of IND-ST if and only if it is secure in the sense of IND-AD.

Theorem 2 [REC-ST

REC-AD] Let

 be a family of graphs corresponding to

partially ordered hierarchies. A time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme for a
family of graphs

 is secure in the sense of REC-ST if and only if it is secure in the

sense of REC-AD.

 REC-ST] Let  be a family of graphs corresponding to partially
ordered hierarchies. If a time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme for  is secure

Theorem 3 [IND-ST

in the sense of IND-ST, then it is secure in the sense of REC-ST.



Theorem 4 [REC-ST >IND-ST] Let

 be a family of graphs corresponding to partially

ordered hierarchies. If there exists a time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme for

 which is secure in the sense of REC-ST, there exists a time-bound hierarchical key
assignment scheme for  which is secure in the sense of REC-ST but which is not secure
in the sense of IND-ST.

